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Abstract
Recent literature on the European debt crisis emphasizes that rising external trade and 
lending imbalances between the European Monetary Union’s (EMU) Northern and 
Southern member states served as a crucial determinant behind speculative divergence 
between these two regions.  However, these gaping external imbalances only emerged 
with the launch of the single currency. In this paper, we examine how three different 
currency regimes – monetary union, fixed exchange rate, and flexible exchange rates – 
influence the mutual co-existence of export-led growth models (which predominate in 
the Eurozone’s crisis-spared Northern economies) and domestic demand-led growth 
models (which predominate in the Eurozone’s crisis-prone Southern economies). We 
hypothesize that external imbalances between these two growth models did not emerge 
prior to EMU because of the presence of two adjustment mechanisms in the real ex-
change rate: the nominal exchange rate (in soft currency regimes) and the promotion 
of inflation convergence by national central banks (in hard currency regimes). Euro-
pean monetary integration removed these two readjustment mechanisms, leading to 
a persistent divergence in the real exchange rate and ultimately to external imbalances 
between Europe’s diverse models of capitalism.
Zusammenfassung
In der neueren Literatur zur europäischen Schuldenkrise wird betont, dass die zuneh-
menden Ungleichgewichte im Leistungs- und Kapitalverkehr zwischen den nördlichen 
und südlichen Mitgliedstaaten der Eurozone ein entscheidender Faktor für den stark 
unterschiedlichen Spekulationsdruck der Investoren auf diese Regionen waren. Jedoch 
traten diese massiven außenwirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichte erst mit der Einführung 
der Gemeinschaftswährung auf. Das Discussion Paper untersucht, wie der Kontext des 
Währungsregimes – unterschieden werden die Währungsunion, das feste und das fle-
xible Wechselkursregime – das Zusammenwirken der exportgetriebenen Wachstums-
modelle (vorherrschend im von der Krise vergleichsweise wenig betroffenen Norden 
Europas) und der binnenorientierten Wachstumsmodelle (vorherrschend im von der 
Krise vergleichsweise stark betroffenen Süden Europas) beeinflusst hat. Dabei wird die 
Hypothese aufgestellt, dass vor dem Inkrafttreten der Europäischen Währungsunion 
keine außenwirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichte zwischen diesen Wachstumsmodellen 
auftraten, da es zwei Mechanismen zur Anpassung des realen Wechselkurses gab: die 
nominale Abwertung (genutzt vor allem von Weichwährungsländern) und die von den 
natio nalen Zentralbanken herbeigeführte Inflationskonvergenz (in Hartwährungslän-
dern). Mit der europäischen Währungsintegration wurden diese beiden Mechanis-
men außer Kraft gesetzt, was eine anhaltende Divergenz der realen Wechselkurse und 
schließlich außenwirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte zwischen den verschiedenen Kapi-
talismusmodellen in Europa zur Folge hatte.
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European Integration and the Incompatibility of Different 
Varieties of Capitalism: Problems with Institutional 
Divergence in a Monetary Union
1 Introduction
Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the limits of European monetary inte-
gration in promoting economic and political unity. Economic fissures have emerged 
between EMU’s Northern (core) and Southern (peripheral) member states1: while the 
former group of countries has emerged from the current crisis relatively unscathed in 
regards to speculation in international bond markets, the latter group has become sub-
ject to intense speculative pressure as investors doubt the solvency of these countries. In 
return for bailout assistance from the “Troika” (the EU Commission, European Central 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), member states in the euro periphery have 
been forced to impose harsh austerity measures, which significantly reduced standards 
of living and heightened doubts about the desirability of further European integration 
among electorates. Six years into the crisis, these economic fissures between the North 
and South largely remain uncorrected, and political mobilization against European in-
tegration continues to increase.
The lack of macroeconomic adjustment tools in EMU’s periphery amidst the Euro-
pean debt crisis prompts the question as to whether European monetary integration 
is capable of producing welfare-improving outcomes for member states with diverse 
national economic systems. We argue that monetary integration may have rendered 
the diverse co-existence of national varieties of capitalism incompatible. The domestic 
organization of different political economies in the North and South of Europe has 
interacted with transnational European monetary policy to produce a persistent and 
unsustainable divergence in trade and external lending, which has been cited by many 
as an underlying instigator of speculative divergence among EMU member states (Bi-
bow 2012; Obstfeld/Rogoff 2009; Shambaugh et al. 2012; Scharpf 2011). We trace this 
divergence to the incompatibility of two distinct growth models; domestic demand-led 
models, which predominate in the new democracies of Southern Europe, and export-
led models, which dominate Northern coordinated market economies. 
We thank Martin Höpner, Erik Jones, and Fritz Scharpf for their incredibly helpful comments. Any 
errors lie solely with the authors.
1 In this paper, we use the terms “core,” “Northern,” and “export-led models” interchangeably to 
describe the EMU economies that have emerged unscathed from the crisis (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and to a lesser degree France). Likewise, we use the terms 
“periphery,” “Southern,” and “domestic demand-led models” to describe EMU countries that 
have fallen into crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and to a lesser extent Ireland). 
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Prior to the formation of EMU, these two growth regimes were able to co-exist with-
out producing significant external lending and current account imbalances between 
each other (see Figure 1). Rather, it was the political drive toward European monetary 
integration which combined these distinct national varieties of capitalism into a single 
currency and subsequently led to large, persistent, and ultimately unsustainable imbal-
ances in trade and external lending. In this regard, the ultimate source of the euro crisis 
can be traced to the asymmetric effects of joining together qualitatively distinct growth 
regimes, or national varieties of capitalism, into a monetary union.
We argue that two factors explain why both growth regimes could co-exist prior to the 
formation of the EMU but not afterwards. The first is due to the presence of the nomi-
nal exchange rate safety valve within soft-peg or flexible exchange rate systems (i.e., euro 
periphery during the early days of the European Monetary System, EMS). Under this 
monetary arrangement, countries with different growth models had greater leeway in 
promoting economic adjustment through currency depreciations/devaluations.2 Sec-
ond, in hard currency exchange rate systems where the nominal exchange rate is fixed 
between countries, competitive realignment between EMU’s diverse growth models was 
2 This is not to suggest that devaluation/revaluation is an optimal strategy to improve cost com-
petitiveness. But it does have different distributional implications for the downward adjustment 
in wages and public spending. 
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Figure 1 External Balances vis-à-vis all trading partners in EMU’s Northern and 
 Southern economies, 1980–2014
Note: Northern economies include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.  
Southern economies include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. We present Southern 
external lending balances with and without Greece because the country lacked external lending data 
before 1995. 
Source: EU AMECO Database (2014).  
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facilitated via inflation-averse central banks at the national level that promoted inflation 
and real exchange rate convergence among participating member states. Once the EMU 
removed the safety valves on the nominal exchange rate and the national central banks 
that promoted inflation and exchange rate convergence, imbalances in the real exchange 
rate, driven purely by divergences in national inflation, grew unchecked, leading to per-
sistent external imbalances between the North and South of the EMU. 
We begin with a review of the recent literature that attempts to explain the divergent 
exposure of the North and the South to the Eurozone crisis. While the current literature 
provides valuable insights into the causes of the crisis, it fails to explain why these two 
diverse systems of capitalism in the North and South only became incompatible under 
a monetary union. We then explain how demand-led and export-led growth regimes 
were able to co-exist prior to the creation of the single currency but not afterwards. 
Utilizing a panel regression model for the EU143 between 1980 and 2012, we find that 
monetary union magnifies the direct influence of national inflation on external (current 
account) balances, making it possible for low-inflationary export-led countries (such 
as Germany) to pursue persistent trade surpluses and external lending balances with 
their high-inflationary domestic demand-led counterparts (across Southern Europe). 
We conclude with a discussion on the political implications of increased European inte-
gration for the co-existence of diverse models of capitalism within the EMU.
2 The loss of competitiveness: Cause or outcome of the euro crisis?
Two competing, although not mutually exclusive, bodies of literature that attempt to 
explain the origins of the Eurozone crisis revolve around rising external imbalances be-
tween the North and South of Europe after the introduction of the single currency. One 
body of literature, the competitiveness argument, tends to focus on how current account 
imbalances led to crisis-exposure in the EMU periphery countries (Belke/Dreger 2011; 
Bibow 2012; Obstfeld/Rogoff 2009; Shambaugh et al. 2012). The core problem suggest-
ed by this literature is that the Eurozone crisis is a structural imbalance between export-
led countries with current account surpluses (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent France) and domestic demand-led countries 
with current account deficits (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and occasionally Ireland). 
Once the monetary union came into play, national competitiveness, conceptualized as 
a country’s real exchange rate, became nothing more than a function of inflation be-
tween those member states trading in the same currency. This implied that those coun-
3 We exclude Luxembourg from our empirical analysis as it was a member of a de facto currency 
union with Belgium prior to its entry into the EMU and hence did not directly impose the same 
national adjustment processes under a soft and hard currency regime as did other EMU candi-
date countries.
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tries which kept their inflation rates low vis-à-vis their trading partners would realize 
a (competitive) real exchange rate advantage, promoting trade surpluses and, with it, 
current account surpluses. 
In order to finance these deficits, however, the South needed to externally borrow 
through the capital account (see Figure 1). Because of a strong home bias in European 
investment (Gros 2012), the external financing of the South’s current account deficits 
during the EMU’s first decade largely stemmed from Northern lending. Such external 
borrowing could either occur via private banking channels (which largely explains crisis 
exposure in fiscally prudent Ireland and Spain) or through public borrowing channels 
(Italy and Greece). Current account deficits are not a problem in themselves and can 
be sustainable if external borrowing is used to enhance productivity in the export sec-
tor and thereby enhance long-term productivtiy. But in the Eurozone periphery, this 
borrowing was largely channeled into nontradable sectors (construction in Ireland and 
Spain, and the public sector in Greece) that are unable to generate the largesse needed 
to underpin future current account surpluses. The persistence of these current account 
deficits in the euro periphery, financed by external lending within Europe, prompted 
markets to doubt total solvency within these member states, exposing them to specula-
tive crisis in 2008.
Hall (2012), Hancké (2013), Höpner (2013), and Johnston et al. (2014) provide a more 
nuanced institutional view as to what gave rise to these competitiveness imbalances in 
the pre-crisis years of the EMU. They argue that the EMU’s Northern economies used 
features of their qualitatively distinct models of capitalism (corporatist wage-bargaining 
institutions) to promote an export-oriented growth regime. Coordinated wage-setting 
institutions constrained the growth of labor costs and, with it, low inflation, which pro-
moted real exchange rate competitiveness. Because the Northern economies were able 
to produce such high levels of wage moderation through their coordinated collective 
bargaining institutions, relative to their Mediterranean trading partners, these member 
states produced persistent current account surpluses that were mirrored in the South 
with current account deficits.
However, in producing significant wage moderation relative to the domestic demand-
oriented economies of the South, which lacked corporatist wage-bargaining institutions 
capable of producing persistent wage moderation, the EMU’s export-led economies 
imposed current account deficits on their Southern trading partners via a beggar-thy-
neighbor wage policy. From the perspective of European integration, the promotion of 
national wage competition in coordinated market economies (CMEs) undermined the 
export competitiveness of non-CME countries sharing the same currency. 
The loss-of-competitiveness argument, it is important to note, explains rising financial 
and trade imbalances between the EMU’s creditor and debtor countries as the causal 
factor via the current account. A second explanation, however, found within the broad-
er international political economy (IPE) and financial liberalization literature, argues 
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the opposite. The loss of competitiveness, from this perspective, was a consequence 
of credit expansion. This literature suggests that, without the existence of a coherent 
financial and/or banking union across Europe, unsustainable imbalances between the 
North and South started in the capital account, which led to the divergences witnessed 
in the current account (Burda 2013; Jones 2014a, 2014b; Lane 2012). The source of ris-
ing economic imbalances between countries in the EMU’s core and its periphery stems 
from the influence of the monetary union on nominal interest rates, which expanded the 
availability of cheap credit for both the private and public sector.4 It is the capital rather 
than the current account that we should examine if we want to explain the divergent 
exposure to speculative market pressure during the Eurozone crisis.
In promoting the relinquishment of capital controls in the 1990s and convergence in 
nominal exchange rates and interest rates, the EMU’s Southern European countries wit-
nessed significant reductions in borrowing costs between the beginning of the 1990s 
and their entry into the EMU (Lane 2012; Burda 2013). Coupled with a greater avail-
ability of financial products through capital market liberalization and changing bank-
lending practices (particularly in the mortgage market), this access to cheap credit fu-
eled consumption and real-estate booms in the euro periphery, which were financed 
largely by banks in the EMU’s core economies. Declines in competitiveness can there-
fore be perceived as a consequence of these international financial developments and 
not their cause. Greater access to cheap credit increased disposable income in domestic 
demand-led countries and led to rises in wages in order for households to maintain 
levels of real consumption. These wage increases, in turn, led to wage-inflation spirals, 
which contributed to an increase in the real exchange rate in domestic demand-led 
economies that were persistently above those in export-led economies between 1999 
and 2008 (see Figure 2). 
4 A third view of the origins of the crisis, the “fiscal view,” argues that divergent patterns in public 
borrowing prior to the financial crisis explain divergent speculative exposure. This rests on a 
similar premise as the financial literature: low interest rates and the lack of proper enforcement 
of the Stability and Growth Pact increased sovereigns’ incentive to borrow, thus promoting high 
deficits and public debt accumulation (see Buiter/Rahbari 2010 for an overview). Empirically, 
however, the fiscal view is so weak in explaining crisis exposure for a number of EMU econo-
mies that we do not seriously consider it here. Spain and Ireland, who had healthy fiscal records, 
were heavily exposed to speculation, while Belgium and Germany, who had poorer pre-crisis 
fiscal performances, were relatively immune from it. Works cited above in the financial litera-
ture largely agree that speculative attack was not precipitated by debt accumulation in the pub-
lic sector alone, but rather in the public and private sectors. 
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Rethinking the causal mechanism: The timing and location of the crisis
Both the competitiveness and financial accounts of the European debt crisis highlight 
important determinants of the crisis that stem from external imbalances between the 
EMU’s member states. Despite these inroads, both exhibit failings in explaining the lo-
cation and timing of the crisis. The competitiveness hypothesis provides a logical expla-
nation why current account imbalances evolved between export-led countries (where 
wage moderation was persistent) and domestic demand-led countries (where wage 
moderation was difficult to enforce). Yet this hypothesis fails to explain why these per-
sistent imbalances only emerged with the creation of the single currency. The different 
growth models within the EMU and the divergence in unit labor costs that they pro-
duced existed well before the creation of monetary union in Europe. During the process 
of European market integration in the 1980s and 1990, these two different varieties of 
capitalism co-existed but failed to produce significant external imbalances, despite hav-
ing very different inflation rates and growth rates in nominal unit labour costs, as they 
did during the EMU (see Figure 1). 
The financial account of the crisis does a better job at explaining the timing of the crisis 
during the late 1990s and 2000s. The higher interest rate premiums associated with 
more volatile currencies in the 1990s and the significant reduction of such premiums 
−4 
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Figure 2 Real exchange rate developments between North and South of EMU,  
 1980–2008, vis-à-vis the EU15
Note: Northern economies include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Southern economies include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Source: EU AMECO Database (2014).
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during the Maastricht convergence period explain why it took until the early 2000s for 
persistent borrowing imbalances to emerge between the North and South of Europe. 
However, the financial literature fails to do a sufficient job in explaining the location of 
the crisis, given the relative absence of these imbalances between the peripheral mem-
ber states of the EMU vis-à-vis non-EU countries. Reductions in nominal interest rates 
increased borrowing incentives substantially in the South, which should, in principle, 
increase demand for credit from all international financial outlets. However, the sup-
ply of credit to the euro periphery possessed a strong intra-euro regional bias and was 
largely delivered from savings in Europe’s Northern banks (Gros 2012; Burda 2013). In 
this account, the problem is not the single currency per se but the failure to create a fi-
nancial union as a complement to the single market. Divergent economic performance 
and growth models associated with different domestic institutions do not feature in the 
financial hypothesis, as the nexus of the crisis lies predominantly in global finance and 
international banking.5
This location bias is also visible in intra- and extra-EU trade statistics, which can par-
tially map the regional imbalances in international capital flows.6 Mirroring the cur-
rent account and external lending imbalances between the EMU’s North and South 
after 1999 (see Figure 1), the growing gap between intra-EU trade deficits in the South 
and intra-EU trade surpluses in the North is noticeably prominent after the creation 
of the single currency. However, the Southern domestic demand-led countries and the 
Northern export-led ones perform almost identically in regards to trade balances vis-
à-vis non-EU countries after 1999.7 Only after the crisis set in did the South and North 
diverge in their net export performance vis-à-vis non-EU countries. This is partially the 
result of firms in Southern member states having to look outside Europe for markets, 
given the persistence of wage and demand suppression in Germany and the collapse in 
domestic demand as a consequence of Troika-imposed austerity. The general point is 
that the divergences in current and capital accounts that we observe in the euro area 
is an internal relation. Addressing these gaps in the competitiveness and financial lit-
erature, we provide below a theoretical explanation why different political-economic 
growth regimes only produced significant external imbalances between each other after 
the creation of the single currency.
5 Capital inflows are obviously important, but they do not fully explain why some countries were 
more susceptible to demand-financed credit booms than were others. This requires a compara-
tive analysis of the differences in domestic political institutions or, as we will argue below, of the 
different varieties of capitalism and growth regimes. 
6 We do not possess data on national capital flow by country of origin, so we use national trade 
data by country of origin to approximate capital imbalances run by the EMU’s Northern and 
Southern economies vis-à-vis their EU and non-EU trading partners.
7 This should not be particularly surprising. Both Southern and Northern EMU countries pos-
sessed a more equal playing field in their extra-EU trade performance because they shared the 
same nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis non-EMU nations. 
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3 A theoretical account of currency regimes and the incompatibility of 
growth models 
We assume that two different models of capitalism, which are sustained by distinct 
political and producer coalitions, dominate Europe’s economic landscape (Hall 2012). 
One model is driven by the economic prominence of the export sector and rests within 
the institutional structures of the EMU’s Northern member states (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands). Countries adhering to this type of growth regime 
are generally small, open economies with high levels of social expenditure (Germany 
is the one exception to this “small state” stereotype) and are highly open to interna-
tional trade (Katzenstein 1985). Because national production is concentrated in indus-
tries where firms are price takers in international markets, countries belonging to this 
growth regime tend to possess coordinated wage-bargaining institutions that deliver 
(nominal) wage moderation, keeping unit labor costs and domestic price inflation low. 
In line with the Varieties of Capitalism literature, these (coordinated market) economies 
have remained successful in maintaining the size of their export sectors amidst global-
ization and European integration because they possess institutions which promote the 
accumulation of skills conducive to high value-added production (Streeck 1997; Hall/
Soskice 2001). Such specialization in high value-added production shields their firms 
from the more intense competition in low-skilled manufacturing that prompted sig-
South
–5 
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Extra-EUPercent of GDP
Note: Northern economies include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Southern economies include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Source: EU AMECO Database (2014).
Figure 3 Extra- and inter-EU net exports for Northern and Southern economies, 1980–2014
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nificant decline in the manufacturing sectors of non-CME economies with the onset of 
intensified globalization, namely in the UK, Spain, and Portugal (Rhodes 2000). While 
the moderation of nominal wages within export-driven nation states limits growth in 
domestic demand, the more substantial size of the export sector relative to the domes-
tic sector compensates for stagnation in domestic consumption, producing aggregate 
(export-driven) economic and employment growth (Dullien 2003).8 
Germany presents a slight dichotomy toward this dynamic of export/domestic demand. 
Prior to reunification, (West) German wage moderation led to current account surplus-
es, and its specialization in high value-added industries maintained manufacturing’s 
sizable share in national economic output. Yet the “interaction” between the tendency 
of Germany’s collective bargaining system to keep wages moderate and the Bundes-
bank’s inflation-averse position also led to low interest rates in the country, stimulating 
domestic investment (Hall 1994; Scharpf 1991). German reunification and the simul-
taneous inflation shocks of integrating East and West German wages, in addition to 
Helmut Kohl’s decision to finance reunification with fiscal expansion, led to a break-
down in wage restraint and monetary policy compatibility. This led to an increase in 
German unemployment, higher interest rates, and a growth in current account defi-
cits, causing Germany to temporally deviate from an export-led growth model. Yet the 
substantial downward adjustment in German wages since the mid 1990’s, which were 
further reinforced by the 2003 Hartz labor market reforms, contributed to a significant 
expansion in Germany’s export performance (and low-wage economy). Between 1992 
and the mid-2000s, Germany was the only large OECD country to witness a doubling 
of its export share (EU AMECO Database, 2014). 
Ireland also presents a temporal contrast to our export-led and domestic demand-led 
growth model analysis. The country realigned itself to a strong export-driven growth 
regime starting in 1987 with the conclusion of the Programme for National Recovery. 
This re-instituted centralized wage bargaining and linked income growth in the US 
multinational sector to those in the more sluggish domestic sector (see Culpepper/
Regan 2014). The underlying political coalition guaranteed wage restraint during the 
mid-1990s and ensured that the competitiveness gains of the 1986 and 1992 currency 
devaluations were not lost, complementing an export-led recovery. But this period of 
cost competitiveness was short-lived. From the late 1990s on, Ireland’s banking, con-
struction, and public sectors, in addition to pro-cyclical fiscal policies by center-right 
populist governments, drove the economy back to the bubble-prone domestic demand-
driven model that had existed previously. Since the onset of the crisis, Ireland has repri-
oritized its export-led growth model through an active industrial strategy of attracting 
direct investment from the United States and other foreign sources via low corporate 
taxes, light-touch regulation, and highly flexible labor markets (Regan 2014).
8 It must be noted that, with a shift from industry to services, these countries increasingly find 
it difficult to create high levels of employment in the export sector, leading to an increasingly 
low-wage ‘dualized labor market.’
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Unlike export-led capitalist growth regimes in Northern Europe, domestic demand-led 
models are supported by political coalitions in the domestic nontraded sector. Coun-
tries adhering to this type of regime are usually large and/or have trade shares that 
are substantially smaller than the size of the domestic economy. These member states 
generally lack coordinated labor-market and industrial-relations institutions that de-
liver substantial wage moderation. Within the EMU, domestic demand-driven mod-
els cluster in Southern Europe’s “low-productivity” economies, whose conflict-prone, 
wage-setting and collective bargaining institutions are predisposed to high inflation 
and trade/current account deficits vis-à-vis their export-led neighbors (see Jones 2003 
for a temporal analysis of current account dynamics between these two different growth 
models). In addition to a higher tendency for wage inflation, domestic demand-led 
growth regimes are much more sensitive to the expansionary credit effect of lower in-
terest rates and capital inflows.
Like Germany and Ireland, France, which oscillated between current account deficits 
in the 1980s and current account surpluses in the 1990s, presents a slightly different 
variation of the domestic demand-led growth model because its wage developments 
conform more to its export-driven Northern neighbors than its Southern demand-
driven ones. While France’s domestic nontraded sector is larger than its export sector, 
it is less prone to inflation than Southern European countries because the state (rather 
than autonomous social partners) guarantees wage moderation through state-imposed 
wage coordination.9 Moderated wage settlements in large multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are legally extended by the Ministry of Labor to the majority of the private 
sector and are subsequently used as the benchmark by the government in public sector 
bargaining (Hancké 2002; Johnston/Hancké 2009). 
It is important to note that the EMU’s demand-led peripheral member states often 
witness low unit labor cost growth in their tradable manufacturing sectors. But higher 
wage growth in nontradable sectors, due to the absence of coordinated wage-bargaining 
institutions, puts pressure on national prices to increase, leaving export-oriented firms 
with an inflationary disadvantage (see Herrmann 2005 for a general overview on the 
link between decentralized, low-cost production regimes and industrial wage differen-
tials within EMU countries). In 2007, the hourly wage in the non-market services sector 
(which encompasses health and social work, education, and public administration and 
defense) in Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal was 38 percent, 24 percent, 50 percent, 
and 120 percent higher, respectively, than the hourly wages in the manufacturing sec-
tor (EU KLEMS 2010). This is not a problem in itself. In contrast, however, the hourly 
wages in the non-market service sector of the EMU’s Northern economies were either 
at parity with (the Netherlands), or below (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, and Ger-
many) the hourly wage in the manufacturing sector. The difference in growth regimes 
9 This is not to suggest that only low wages produces low inflation. Bank lending practices matter. 
But as we will illustrate in the empirical section, the impact of inflation on external imbalances 
is conditional upon the exchange rate regime.
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steered by qualitatively distinct coalitions of political leaders and firms in different eco-
nomic sectors goes a long way to explaining this difference in wage-bargaining and 
labor market outcomes.
Because domestic demand-led economies are less prone toward producing wage mod-
eration than their export-led counterparts, ceteris paribus, their firms will always hold 
a more disadvantageous inflation position when competing with firms in export-led 
economies.10 However, this higher inflation penalty does not necessarily translate into 
worsened external balances vis-à-vis export-led countries, as inflation’s influence on the 
real exchange rate – which is the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the 
domestic price level, relative to the price level of their trading partners – may be offset 
by changes in the nominal exchange rate. In some currency regimes, the nominal ex-
change rate and domestic inflation do not move in tandem, meaning that the increase 
in one will be offset by a decrease in the other. The process of European monetary inte-
gration and, in particular, the single euro currency, changed all of this. 
European monetary integration: Adjustment mechanisms in three currency 
regimes
What can account for the synergy and co-existence of demand-led and export-led capi-
talist growth regimes in the 1980s and the 1990s that disappeared with the onset of the 
single currency? We postulate that the primary reason why different national growth 
models in Europe could co-exist, or did not produce unsustainable external imbal-
ances between each other, is due to the presence of adjustment mechanisms outside of 
monetary union that affect the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate – a country’s 
nominal exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the domestic price level, relative to the 
price level of its trading partner – is an important determinant of external capital and 
trade balances. Ceteris paribus, either an increase in the nominal exchange rate (cur-
rency) or domestic inflation (prices) will lead to an increase in the real exchange rate. 
The outcome is a worsening of a country’s external trade/current account balance and, 
if possible, macroeconomic intervention aimed at politically adjusting the imbalance.
In order to conceptualize how the tools of political intervention (by national govern-
ments and central banks) in currency regimes outside of monetary union limit exter-
nal imbalances between growth models in the Eurozone, it is necessary to differentiate 
between two different currency regime types: hard currency or fixed exchange rate sys-
tems, where nominal exchange rate realignment is limited (managed by national central 
banks), and soft currency or flexible exchange rate systems, where nominal exchange rate 
10 For the sake of parsimony, we ignore differences in exposure to international price shocks and 
international capital mobility, which influence inflation differentials between export and do-
mestic demand-led growth models.
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realignment/movement gives countries greater capacity to adjust for domestic price in-
creases (government intervention).11 Both of these international monetary regimes fa-
cilitated competitive realignment in Europe between export-led growth models (with 
a propensity toward low inflation) and domestic demand-led growth models (with a 
propensity toward high inflation), but they differ in how they achieve this realignment. 
Soft currency and flexible exchange rate systems promote competitive and external bor-
rowing realignment through depreciation/devaluation and appreciation/revaluation 
(i.e., Southern European countries before Maastricht). When nation states possess their 
own currencies in this monetary regime, adjustments are made for price imbalances in 
the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the price of national currency). Currencies in domestic 
demand-led growth models, which are more prone to produce high inflation, lose their 
value relative to countries with strong export-led growth, thereby compensating for 
the lack of price competitiveness in the domestic real exchange rate. (Table 1 provides 
average nominal exchange rate appreciations for EMU countries during the 1980s and 
1990s. In domestic demand-led economies, higher inflation rates correspond with de-
preciations of the average nominal exchange rate, and in export-driven ones, lower in-
flation rates correspond to appreciations of it.). These devalued currencies also produce 
higher exchange rate risk premium in international markets, thereby triggering higher 
interest rates and limiting the scale of external borrowing. It offsets the dual problem 
11 We treat soft-peg and flexible exchange rate regimes similarly in this paper, because the former, 
like the latter, is highly permissive in nominal exchange rate adjustment.
Table 1 Nominal exchange rate changes and inflation averages for the EMU11, in percent
Average annual change in  
the nominal exchange rate
Average annual change  
in inflation 
1980s 1990–1998 1980s 1990–1998
Austria 2.41 1.40 3.84 2.61
Belgium -0.56 1.33 4.90 2.26
Finland 1.43 -1.27 7.32 2.24
Germany 2.89 2.00 2.90 2.73
The Netherlands 1.84 1.32 3.00 2.60
Export-led average 1.60 0.96 4.39 2.49
Greece -11.67 -4.83 19.50 12.05
Italy -2.41 -1.45 11.20 4.38
Portugal -8.83 -0.87 17.35 6.59
Spain -2.34 -1.57 10.26 4.44
Domestic demand-led average -6.31 -2.18 14.58 6.87
France -1.69 1.92 7.38 2.06
Ireland -1.33 0.50 9.34 2.39
Oscillating demand/export 
economies average -1.51 1.21 8.36 2.23
Note: Positive changes in the nominal exchange rate imply currency appreciations/depreciations. 
Source: EU AMECO Database (2014).
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identified by both the competitiveness and financial hypothesis as outlined in section 2: 
the direct influence of wage inflation on the real exchange rate is mitigated, and actors 
cannot borrow cheaply in international markets.
Likewise, the price of the currency in export-driven growth regimes, which have the 
institutional capacity to produce lower levels of inflation via wage moderation, gains in 
nominal value (i.e., appreciates). This increase in the price of their currency undercuts 
the price competitiveness in their real exchange rate. These appreciated currencies also 
produce lower exchange rate risk premium, leading international markets to grant lower 
interest rates, which, ceteris paribus, enhances demand for external borrowing. Most of 
what would later become the “Eurozone core” (i.e., Northern CME-oriented countries) 
exited this soft-peg international currency regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But 
this was not the case for peripheral European countries, which predominately entered a 
hard currency peg during the Maastricht convergence period. 
In 1979 the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was created to put an end to a 
system of competitive devaluations and to institute an unaccommodating monetary re-
gime.12 Several EU nation states committed to a hard currency peg with the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), which was, de-facto, centered on the German mark. Germany 
and the Netherlands entered the ERM with a hard currency policy already in place. Like-
wise, Austria established a unilateral hard peg with the German mark in the late 1970s 
(McNamara 1998; Hochreiter/Winckler 1995). Belgium committed to a hard peg slight-
ly later and initiated its last significant external devaluation in 1983, while France and 
Ireland undertook their last significant devaluation in 1986 and 1992, respectively (Mc-
Namara 1998: 142; Enderlein 2006; Kelly 2003). Finland presents a slight deviation from 
its export-led neighbors. Between 1979 and the late 1980s, it pursued a highly permissive 
soft-currency peg with a basket of currencies (the German mark had a dominant weight) 
that resulted in the markka losing 60 percent of its value relative to the German mark 
between the mid-1970s and 1989 (Genberg 2004). Finland briefly attempted a hard peg 
with the ECU between 1991 and 1992, but the 1992 ERM currency crisis, coupled with a 
severe recession, forced it to exit the arrangement. It did not rejoin until 1996.
The EMU’s Southern member states entered the hard-currency peg of the ERM much 
later, and with very different domestic institutions. Spain joined in 1989 with a wider 
fluctuation band of ±6 percent, Portugal entered in 1992 also with a ±6 percent fluc-
tuation margin, and Greece finally initiated its adjustment toward a hard-currency re-
gime in 1994 (Ungerer et al. 1990; Tavlas/Papaspyrou n.d.). Italy failed to transfer to 
the narrow ±2.25 percent fluctuation bands until 1990 (Ungerer et al. 1990; McNamara 
2005). It is important to note that these Southern European member states had signifi-
cantly higher inflation rates relative to their export-led Northern neighbors, but during 
12 National “models” of capitalism shaped the politics behind this process of European monetary 
integration. The previous “soft currencies” wanted access to capital flows, whereas the “hard 
currencies” wanted access to stable markets. 
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this period the political tool of currency depreciation/devaluation compensated for the 
negative impact of inflation on the real exchange rate. On average, currencies in these 
member states depreciated or were devalued by 6.31 percent every year in the 1980s, 
compared to the average annual revaluation/appreciation of 1.6 percent in the North. 
The ultimate result of this symmetry in the price of currency between different na-
tional varieties of capitalism within the EU was twofold. First, those nation states in 
Europe with a propensity toward high inflation and domestic demand-led growth en-
joyed a depreciating/devalued currency that limited increases in the real exchange rate. 
In turn, these countries avoided the accumulation of significant current account deficits 
(avoiding a competitiveness and balance-of-trade crisis). Second, interest rates reflected 
the price of nominal exchange rate risk on the international market and thus limited 
overextension in external borrowing. Therefore, external imbalances between Europe’s 
different growth models, whether observed in the current or capital account, failed to 
materialize within the context of this looser form of European (monetary) integration. 
Different varieties of capitalism, pursuing distinct strategies of economic and employ-
ment growth, could co-exist.
From hard-currency adjustment to monetary union
The same co-existence of growth regimes occurred in hard-peg fixed exchange rate sys-
tems (which, as outlined earlier, had existed in Northern Europe since the early 1980s). 
This currency regime promoted competitive and external borrowing realignment be-
tween export-led and domestic demand-driven growth models by way of inflation 
convergence. Such inflation convergence is only possible, however, in the presence of 
national central banks that respond to domestic price developments through direct tar-
geting of the real exchange rate. With perfect capital mobility, the pursuit of indepen-
dent monetary readjustment is not possible under a fixed exchange rate (Mundell 1961; 
Fleming 1962), and national banks must target the inflation performance of the anchor 
currency.13 This hard-peg obligation limits the political intervention of national gov-
ernments and their capacity to use currency devaluations for competitive realignment. 
Central banks in domestic demand-led models cannot respond to high inflation with 
nominal exchange rate adjustments under this currency regime; therefore they must 
respond to high inflation with monetary contraction (McNamara 1998). This process 
of adjustment (or austerity) occurred in Southern Europe during the Maastricht con-
vergence period.
13 Of course, the anchor currency could be exposed to price shocks, which would lead to higher 
inflation. In this case, however, the shadow currency would need to follow such inflation devel-
opments in order to uphold the peg.
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The enforcement of a hard-currency policy through monetary contraction as conducted 
by national central banks was relatively successful at producing inflation convergence 
between export-led and domestic demand-led growth models within Europe. This con-
vergence was institutionalized at the European level with the Maastricht nominal crite-
ria between 1992 and 1998 (or for Finland, which entered the EU in 1995 without the 
credible pursuit of a hard-currency policy, from 1995 to 1998). In order to fulfil inflation 
requirements for EMU entry and commit to a de facto hard-peg regime, Ireland and 
Southern European countries instituted painful downward adjustments in wages and 
public spending, often through national “social pacts” between governments, unions, 
and employers14 (Johnston 2012). The final result of these domestic adjustment pro-
cesses was similar to that delivered in a soft-peg regime. Although the nominal exchange 
rate was fixed, inflation convergence in the 1990s ensured convergence in real exchange 
rates between EMU’s export-led and domestic demand-led models, which limited di-
vergence in current account balances and facilitated the co-existence of growth regimes 
in the context of European integration.
The creation of the EMU eliminated both adjustment mechanisms in the soft-peg and 
hard-peg arrangements. Under a common currency, the nominal exchange rate disap-
peared, eliminating its role as an adjustment mechanism for taming diverging inflation 
performances in the real exchange rate. The monetary union’s new real exchange rate 
identity, which became solely a function of relative inflation, provided export-led coun-
tries in Northern Europe with a persistent competitive advantage with regard to infla-
tion. Furthermore, while countries in hard and unaccommodating currency regimes 
lacked the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism, the institutional feature 
that facilitated the convergence of inflation and real exchange rates between different 
European varieties of capitalism – the national central banks – also disappeared. Nation 
states transferred this problem-solving capacity to a new central bank in Frankfurt: the 
European Central Bank (ECB), which targeted average inflation rates across very differ-
ent political economies and possessed limited capacity to deliver inflation convergence 
among diverse EMU member states. The presence or absence of a financial-banking 
union (the financial hypothesis) would have made no difference.
Although the supranational ECB was very adverse to inflation, its jurisdiction was the 
euro area, not the individual national political economies that constitute the Eurozone. 
Consequently, it could not use a one-size-fits-all monetary policy to enforce low infla-
tion in those member states with demand-led growth models like its national central 
bank predecessors had done previously. The absence of national central banks aimed 
at promoting inflation convergence had immediate effects on the real exchange rate. 
Inflation and the real exchange rate slowly but persistently diverged between the EMU’s 
export-led and demand-led growth regimes. This was not due to the resurgence in wage 
14 This is what these countries are attempting today, except the process is not through domestic 
social pacts but through strict conditionality requirements imposed by international creditors 
– the Troika.
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inflation in domestic demand-led economies per se. The EMU’s peripheral states wit-
nessed lower inflation rates in the pre-crisis 2000s than they did in the 1990s. Rather, 
it was largely facilitated by wage moderation and deflation in the coordinated market 
economies of the North. These deflationary pressures were most prominent in Ger-
many, where the average inflation rate in the pre-crisis EMU years (1999–2007) was 
roughly half that of the Maastricht period (1992–1998). In 1999, inflation differentials 
between EMU’s Northern and Southern economies were roughly 2 percent. By 2001, 
these inflation differentials had doubled (EU AMECO Database, 2014). Such inflation 
differentials accumulated year on year and transpired into a persistent divergence in the 
real exchange rate (Höpner/Lutter 2014). 
In this regard, European monetary integration did not achieve its political objective of 
economic and institutional convergence among participating member states. The EMU 
contributed to the imbalance of capitalism by establishing an environment where per-
sistent divergence in the real exchange rate and, in turn, external imbalances between 
the North and South of Europe were possible. Contrary to the literature (and the Euro-
pean Commission) that criticizes rigid labor market institutions and large welfare states 
within an integrated international economic system (OECD 1994; Siebert 1997; Sibert/
Sutherland 2000), the biggest losers of European monetary integration were not the so-
cial market economies of Northern Europe, with historically specific export-led growth 
regimes, but those EMU member states lacking CME “micro foundations.” Monetary 
union removed the two adjustment mechanisms – exchange rate adjustment and na-
tional central banks – that made the co-existence of different varieties of capitalism 
within Europe possible. 
4 Empirical evidence from the EU14: Currency regimes, inflation 
performance, and external balances
Using cross-sectional time series regression of the EU1415 from 1980 to 2012, we exam-
ine how different currency regimes interact with conflicting components of the real ex-
change rate – domestic inflation and the nominal exchange rate – to influence a member 
state’s external imbalances in the current account. We expand our sample to the EU14’s 
non-EMU countries in order to capture variation in current account, inflation, and 
the nominal exchange rate after 1999, but we also limit our sample to these countries, 
because the national nominal exchange rate index data we use from the EU’s AMECO 
Database is constructed relative to the EU15. The current account is composed of a 
country’s net exports (the largest item), net income from abroad, and net transfers of 
15 These countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (who 
entered in 2001), Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. 
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assistance. Rather than modeling the current account as a function of the three items, 
we focus on variables that are directly linked to the movement of these components: the 
real exchange rate, which we separate into the nominal exchange rate and a country’s 
inflation performance which is heavily influenced by a growth model’s capacity to pro-
duce wage moderation, and growth in (real) per capita national incomes. We introduce 
a slight innovation into this model, however, by examining the interaction between the 
three currency regimes outlined above and (the) nominal exchange rate/inflation. The 
purpose of this is to examine the influence of the nominal exchange rate and domestic 
inflation on the current account under different currency regimes and to identify mon-
etary regimes where inflation performance leads to persistent improvements/decline in 
the current account balance. 
Our baseline model can be summarized as follows:
(CAi,t - CAi,t – 1) is the first difference16 of country i’s current account (as a percentage 
of GDP) at time t, NERi,t is the (annual percentage change) in the nominal exchange 
rate of country i at time t, and CPIi,t is the inflation rate of country i at time t. EMUi,t 
is a dummy variable indicating whether a country is in monetary union at time t. HARDi,t is a dummy variable indicating whether a country is subject to a hard-currency 
peg (i.e., fixed exchange rate arrangements with a restrictive ±2.25 percent or lower 
fluctuation band) or the Maastricht nominal criteria at time t. The baseline (omitted) 
currency regime category is a flexible/soft-currency peg exchange rate arrangement 
(the Appendix details which currency regime to which each EU14 country belonged 
between 1980 and 2012). (EMU * NER )i,t and (EMU * CPI )i,t are interactions between 
the EMU dummy and the nominal exchange rate and inflation rate, respectively. Like-
wise, (HARD * NER )i,t and (HARD * CPI )i,t are interactions between the hard-peg/
Maastricht currency regime dummy and the nominal exchange rate and inflation rate, 
respectively. GDPPCi,t is real per capita GDP growth in country i at time t. Current ac-
count, nominal effective exchange rate, and inflation data were taken from the EU’s 
AMECO database, while real GDP per capita (in US dollars, purchasing power parity) 
data was taken from the OECD.
In order to control for omitted time and country effects, we incorporate (n–1) country 
and time dummies into our model. While several studies have questioned the use of 
fixed effects, which have the potential to crowd out the explanatory power of relative 
invariant regressors (see Kittel/Winner 2005 and Plümper et al. 2005), we include them 
16 We take the first difference of the current account because a Hadri-LM unit root test indicated 
the current account balance (as a percentage of GDP) was non-stationary (z-statistic = 38.37, 
p-value = 0.0000) 
(CAi,t - CAi,t – 1) =  αi + β1NERi,t + β2CPIi,t  + β3EMUi,t + β4HARDi,t + 
β5(EMU * NER )i,t + β6(HARD * NER )i,t + β7(EMU * CPI )i,t + β8(HARD * CPI )i,t + β6GDPPCi,t + εi,t
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in our model since our variables are stochastic and are not presented in levels (addition-
ally, our results are consistent when we use a random effects estimator). We also utilize 
country-clustered standard errors in order to correct for contemporaneous correlation 
and panel heteroskedasticity.17 The use of panel-corrected standard errors has become 
a popular remedy in political science for both of these problems (see Beck/Katz 1995), 
yet we opt for clustered standard errors because they produce more unforgiving robust 
standard errors (see Rogers 2003). 
Because the flexible/soft-peg currency arrangement is the baseline category, the nomi-
nal exchange rate and inflation effects on the current account under this currency re-
gime are exhibited in the hierarchical terms β1 and β2. Given our theory about the way 
the nominal exchange rate counteracts inflation’s influence on the real exchange rate in 
flexible/soft-peg exchange rate systems, we anticipate that neither the nominal exchange 
rate nor the inflation hierarchal terms will correlate directly with changes in the current 
account. A significant pair-wise correlation coefficient of -0.55 between the nominal 
exchange rate and inflation under the flexible/soft-peg system indicates that these two 
components work strongly against each other in the real exchange rate. In other words, 
we anticipate that both β1 and β2 will exhibit nonsignificance in explaining current ac-
count imbalances. We also anticipate the hard currency regime’s interaction term with 
inflation (β8) will display nonsignificance, as countries that engage in this currency ar-
rangement converge in their inflation behavior. 
The hard currency regime’s interaction with the nominal exchange rate (whose effect is 
captured in β6) and monetary union’s interaction with the nominal exchange rate (cap-
tured in β5) may also display insignificance. Under both a hard-peg and single currency, 
the nominal exchange rate no longer provides an adjustment mechanism amongst its 
participants, because countries entering these currency regimes must, or do in the case 
of monetary union, converge in their nominal exchange rate behavior. However, β5 or 
β6 may hold a significant negative coefficient, if joint increases in the nominal exchange 
rate of the hard currency or EMU regime prompts their members to lose exchange rate 
competitiveness en masse vis-à-vis countries that are participating within soft currency 
arrangements. Joint increases in the nominal exchange rate, therefore, would prompt a 
decline in competitiveness and a reduction in the current account balance via countries 
that are not members of a hard currency regime/currency union. 
The direct influence of inflation on the current account should be conditional on the 
presence of monetary union. Because the real exchange rate between countries that 
share a similar currency is simply the ratio of prices between these countries, and be-
17 A Wooldridge test for auto-correlation (F-statistic of 5.205, p-value = 0.040) and an LR statistic 
of panel heteroskedasticity (Chi-squared statistic of 102.13, p-value = 0.000, run without time 
dummies because of the lack of iterative convergence) for Model III in Table 2 provide sufficient 
evidence that both first-order serial correlation and panel heteroskedasticity were present in the 
baseline model. 
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cause national central banks no longer exist to facilitate inflation convergence with the 
onset of monetary union, an increase in a country’s inflation rate will lead to a higher 
real exchange rate and hence a reduction in the current account balance. Therefore, β7 
should be significantly associated with current account decline given inflation’s direct effect 
on the real exchange rate under a common currency (an increase in the domestic inflation 
rate leads to a direct increase in the real exchange rate in a currency union, worsening 
the current account balance for this member state). 
Finally, we include growth in real GDP per capita income as a control, given its negative 
relationship with the current account: as incomes increase, imports increase, leading to 
trade deficits and ultimately current account deficits. Table 2 presents our three models: 
one includes only the influence of the nominal exchange rate and its conditional inter-
action with monetary union and a hard-peg regime, one includes only the influence 
of inflation and its conditional interaction with monetary union and a hard currency 
regime, and one includes both dynamics.
Our results in Table 2 conform to our hypotheses. In soft-peg/flexible currency regimes, 
the (hierarchical) inflation and the nominal exchange rate variables display a nonsig-
nificant relationship with changes in the current account. Such a result is not surprising 
given that an increase in inflation precipitates a decline in the nominal exchange rate, 
mitigating both variables’ direct effect on the current account. Likewise, the interaction 
term between the hard-peg/Maastricht currency regime and the inflation rate is also 
not significant. This, too, is unsurprising given that countries that enter hard fixed ex-
change rate arrangements witness inflation convergence and thus exhibit minimal dif-
ferences in this component of the real exchange rate. The interaction term between the 
EMU and the nominal exchange rate is negatively significant, indicating that increases 
in the euro’s nominal exchange rate leads to a worsening of the current accounts of 
EMU countries vis-à-vis countries engaged in soft currency regimes. Even though the 
interaction term between the hard currency peg and the nominal exchange rate was also 
negative, it failed to hold significance. The EMU dummy is also positively significant 
in two of the three models, indicating that countries are more likely to witness positive 
increases in the current account under monetary union, compared to a soft currency 
regime. This association may be driven by the rapid increases in current account bal-
ances as were witnessed in the South after the 2008 financial crisis and caused largely 
by the substantial collapse in incomes and import demand that resulted from austerity 
(see Figure 1). 
When interacted with monetary union, inflation becomes significantly correlated with 
a worsening of the current account. Keeping all else equal, if a country’s inflation rate 
grows by 1 percent in a given year under monetary union, this will prompt, roughly, a 
0.3 percent (of GDP) decline in the current account balance. Since domestic demand-
led growth economies in Southern Europe produce consistently higher inflation than 
export-led economies in Northern Europe, our results indicate that such inflation per-
formances will translate into persistent decline in the current account balance only un-
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der monetary union. Under hard and soft currency regimes, higher inflation rates do not 
translate into the persistent worsening of current account balances. Real GDP per capita 
growth, like the interaction between monetary union and national inflation, exhibits a 
negative relationship with the change in the current account balance. This suggests that 
inflationary wage and asset price developments in domestic demand-led growth mod-
els may produce two effects that worsen the current account under monetary union: 
inflation would increase the real exchange rate, making firms within these countries 
less competitive and prompting exports to decline, and, if buoyed by wage-setters re-
sponse to inflation, a higher real GDP per capita growth would further reinforce this 
downward pressure on the current account balance. The beta coefficient of real GDP 
growth also highlights the trajectory of “adjustment” in the South in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis. The austerity-induced collapse in incomes precipitated a col-
lapse in import demand in these member states, which partially rectified their large 
pre-crisis current account deficits. 
Table 2 Direct and conditional effects of inflation and the nominal effective exchange rate   
 on current account balances for the EU14, 1980–2012
 I II III
Δ Real per capita income  -0.2391*** -0.2287*** -0.2351***
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.044)
EMU dummy 0.0826 0.7866** 0.8100**
 (0.417) (0.399) (0.380)
Hard-peg dummy -0.1743 -0.2423 -0.1621
 (0.184) (0.371) (0.384)
Δ NER 0.0156  0.0095
 (0.030)  (0.023)
Δ NER * EMU dummy -0.2802**  -0.2568**
 (0.122)  (0.119)
Δ NER * Hard-peg dummy -0.0338  -0.0252
(0.044)  (0.043)
Δ CPI  -0.0259 -0.0238
  (0.048) (0.043)
Δ CPI * EMU dummy  -0.3450*** -0.3274***
  (0.118) (0.110)
Δ CPI * Hard-peg dummy 0.0053 -0.0113
 (0.050) (0.051)
Constant 0.632 1.2288*** 0.6948
 (0.603) (0.418) (0.499)
Number of observations 448 448 448
R-squared (within panels) 0.2207 0.2251 0.2362
Note: The dependent variable is the first difference in the current account balance (as a percentage of GDP). 
The model used was a pooled cross-sectional time series OLS estimator for the EU14 (excluding Luxembourg) 
from 1980 to 2012. N-1 country and time dummies are included but not shown. Country clustered standard 
errors are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence 
level, respectively.
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5 Conclusion: The future of European integration and national varieties of 
capitalism 
Using the Eurozone as a regional case study in international political economy, we 
have illustrated the incompatibility and asymmetric effects of joining together distinct 
capitalist growth regimes (export-led and demand-led) into a monetary union. These 
growth models could co-exist in previous currency regimes because policymakers had 
access to macroeconomic instruments of adjustment to tame the worst effects of price 
divergence. Without nominal exchange rate adjustments (soft currency) and national 
central banks that actively targeted the real exchange rate (hard currency), these growth 
regimes have become increasingly incompatible in Europe, as large and persistent exter-
nal imbalances have growth between them. 
What does this mean for the political economy of European integration? Though the 
EU has implemented new forms of further macroeconomic integration in attempts to 
rectify the crisis, most notably the recent banking union and the European Stability 
Mechanism, these efforts ignore the fundamental adjustment problem that we have 
outlined above. As long as some member states possess domestic institutions that grant 
them a comparative advantage in producing low inflation, they will, de facto, have a 
persistent competitive advantage in the real exchange rate that is conducive to accumu-
lating current account surpluses. Even the creation of a fiscal union with the capacity 
for income transfers is unlikely to rectify such imbalances. While income transfers from 
prosperous to struggling regions might help offset some of the income losses that have 
emerged from the current debt crisis, they will not compensate for the lack of inflation 
adjustment mechanisms that underpin the growing “imbalance of capitalisms” between 
models of export-led growth and of domestic demand-driven growth in Europe’s mon-
etary union.
Does this mean all is lost in the cause of integrating diverse systems of capitalism into 
a single currency?18 Our research suggests that the EU has some capacity to manage 
the growth of external imbalances between export-led and domestic demand-driven 
growth regimes via supranational wage coordination. Although the institutional foun-
dations to coordinated wage inflation are certainly present in the Northern corporatist 
economies of the EMU, the political conditions to facilitate this intervention in the Ger-
man labor market are largely absent. It would require the German government and em-
ployers to abandon, albeit periodically, the growth model that provides Germany with 
comparative advantages in international markets. At the same time, it does suggest that 
the EU needs to seriously reconsider the Troika’s austerity policies. The EU is indirectly 
managing income divergences between member states via the uniform reduction of 
wages and public services in peripheral member states. These have produced significant 
18 See the debate in Wolfgang Streeck, 2014: Small-State Nostalgia? The Currency Union, Germa-
ny, and Europe: A Reply to Jürgen Habermas. In: Constellations 21, 213–221; doi: 10.1111/1467-
8675.12083.
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deflationary effects with long-term social consequences. However, this supranational 
income management (based on a conspicuous growth strategy of supply-side structural 
reforms) has been entirely one-sided. 
While domestic demand-led models of the EMU are forced to pursue painful auster-
ity measures that have reduced inflation and increased unemployment, no attempt has 
been made to correct the excessive levels of wage moderation in Germany, which is a 
core factor in explaining the crisis. The result of the Troika policy response has been to 
establish an asymmetric low-growth equilibrium within Europe; the collapse of import 
demand in the periphery has partially corrected their current account imbalances, but 
export-led economies continue to pursue low inflation strategies in an effort to sustain 
their current account surpluses. If Europe is to see an end to its current crisis, it must 
address the deflationary bias within its monetary union that grants export-led member 
states with persistent comparative advantage in their real exchange rates. Consideration 
should be made to coordinate and incentivize more robust wage growth in its Northern 
economies in order to assist with demand recovery in the South. 
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Appendix
Currency regime membership for the EU14, 1980–2012
Country Soft-peg  
(EMS for late converts) 
Flexible system
Hard currency  
(EMS for early converts)
Maastricht system
Monetary Union
Austria NA 1979–1995 (unilateral peg 
with Germany); 1995–1998 
(ERM and Maastricht)
1999–2012
Belgium 1980–1983 1984–1998 1999–2012
Denmark 1980–1982 1983–2012 NA
Finland 1980–1990, 1992–1994 1991, 1995–1998 1999–2012
France 1980–1986 1987–1998 1999–2012
Germany NA 1980–1998 1999–2012
Greece 1980–1993 1994–2000 2001–2012
Ireland 1980–1986 1987–1998 1999–2012
Italy 1980–1990 1991–1998 1999–2012
Netherlands NA 1980–1998 1999–2012
Portugal 1980–1991 1992–1998 1999–2012
Spain 1980–1991 1992–1998 1999–2012
Swedena 1980–1990, 1993–2012 1991–1992 NA
United Kingdomb 1980–2012 NA NA
Sources: Hochreiter/Winckler (1995), Enderlein (2006), Genberg (2004), Kelly (2003), McNamara (1998, 
2005), Ungerer et al. (1990), Tavlas/Papaspyrou (n.d.). 
a  Sweden joined the ERM briefly in 1991, exiting after the 1992 ERM crisis, and maintained a narrow 
±1.5% fluctuation band (Svensson 1994).  
b  The UK is classified as a soft peg during its brief membership in the ERM in the early 1990s because of its 
wider fluctuation margin of ±6% (Ungerer et al. 1990).
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